Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
History Faculty Books and Book Chapters

History

6-1-2011

No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress
in the Vietnam War
Gregory A. Daddis
Chapman University, daddis@chapman.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/history_books
Part of the Asian History Commons, Cultural History Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, Military
History Commons, Other History Commons, Political History Commons, Public History Commons, Social
History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Daddis, Gregory A. No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the History at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Books and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of
Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

MEASURING U.S. ARMY EFFE
IN THE VI

VEN

SAND PROGR

NAM WAR

Gregory A. Daddis
OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

---------~---

-

______ _________________________
.......,.

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further
Oxford University's objective of excellence
in research, scholarship, and education.
Oxford New York
Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto
With offices in
Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright© 20II by Gregory A. Daddis
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc.
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016
www.oup.com
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

To my father, Robert G. Daddis
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Daddis, Gregory A., 1967No sure victory : measuring US. Army effectiveness and progress in the Vietnam War I Gregory A. Daddis.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-19-974687-3 (acid-free paper) 1. Vietnam War, 1961-1975-United States 2. United States. Army-Evaluation.
3. United States. Army-History-Vietnam War, 1961-1975. I. Title.
DS558.2.D34 2011
2oroo273II

35798642
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper

"Then, no matter what we do in the military field there is no sure
-President LYNDON B. JOHNSON
"That's right. We have been too optimistic."
-Secretary Of Defense ROBERT s. MCNAMARA
White House Meeting, December 18, 1965

ON JUNE

6,

1944,

American, British, and Canadian forces launched their am-

phibious invasion against Hider's Atlantic Wall. Determined to secure a foothold
on French soil, Allied soldiers labored through

English Channel's surf, only to

be met by mines, obstacles, and the covering fire of German defenders. One American combat engineer in the Easy Red sector of Omaha Beach articulated the fears
of many Allied commanders fretting the lack of progress on the 1st Infantry Division assault beaches. "We were really just pinned down and couldn't really see anyone to shoot at. Around ten o'clock things looked hopeless on our part of
beach." 1 By mid-day, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, the U.S. First Army's
commander, was becoming increasingly alarmed over stagnating conditions on the
beachheads. Fragmentary reports from Leonard T. Gerow's V Corps created added
confusion. Bradley recalled that as the Omaha landings fell "hours and hours
behind schedule" the Allied command faced an "imminent crisis" about whether
and how to deploy follow-up forces. Throughout the day, Bradley and his officers
agonized over potential German counterattacks. 2
On the beaches, small groups of infantrymen struggled to make their way inland
under withering German fire. Carnage was everywhere. A lieutenant in the U.S. 29th
Infantry Division estimated that for every mo yards of beach, 35 to 50 corpses lay
slumped on the sand. 3 Despite the damage they suffered, the Americans slowly
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effectiveness and progress. In

pinned down on beaches Easy Red) Easy Green) Fox Red advancing up heights behind
beaches."4 As midnight approached, the Americans held a tenuous grip on the French

how did they know if they were winning? Terrain arguably served as the most
scorecard. In fact, during the Normandy campaign, unit effectiveness and rr.t·nr,, ..r1

mainland. They were, however, still far short of their objectives outlined in the orig-

progress could be determined using a number of quantitative

inal Overlord plans. The 4,649 casualties sustained in Bradley's First Army on June

number of troops or units ashore in France, the amount of territory under Allied

6 clearly indicated that putting 55,000 men ashore had been no simple task-despite

control, the number of phase lines passed, or

the beach codenames of Easy Red and Easy Green. 5 But signs of progress did exist.

wounded, or captured. American commanders considered their troops effective

By the end ofD-Day, eight Allied divisions and three armored brigades had made it

because they were making progress in capturing territory and killing the enemy,

safely ashore. By D+1, over

of which led to ultimate victory.

177,000

troops had landed on four beachheads secured

by an increasingly sturdy defensive perimeter supported by Allied air and naval
power.
Over the next

number of Germans

Less than a quarter of a century after the D-Day landings at Normandy, assessing
wartime progress and effectiveness proved much more challenging. When

weeks, American and Allied forces made even more tangible

States Regular Army and Marine forces arrived in the Republic of South Vietnam in

progress. After consolidating its hold on the Normandy beaches, Bradley's First

1965 they confronted a war in which useful metrics for success or failure were not

Army captured Carentan on June

readily identifiable. With a ubiquitous enemy and no dearly defined front lines, U.S.

12,

effecting a link-up between the Utah and

Omaha beachheads. On June 14, Major General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps

soldiers and commanders struggled to devise substitutes for gauging progress

launched an offensive to seize the port facilities at Cherbourg, which fell on June 2 7.

effectiveness. Their conventional World War II experiences offered few useful per-

All the while, logistical buildup on the original landing beaches continued at a steady

spectives. Occupying terrain no longer indicated military success. The political con-

pace, despite severe July storms in the English Channel. As Bradley later wrote,

text of fighting an insurgency complicated the process of counting destroyed enemy

"France was supposed to be liberated in phases and we now stood at the brink of the

units or determining if hamlets and villages were secured or pacified. In short, the

first: a swift push from the grassy pasture lands of Normandy to the sleepy banks of
the Seine." 6

metrics for assessing progress and effectiveness in World War II no longer sufficed
for counterinsurgency operations. Operation Attleboro, fought between September

This next phase in the Allied operation advanced less smoothly than the First

14 and November 24, 1966, typified the complexities of evaluating unit effectiveness

Army Commander envisioned. U.S. forces, now confronting Germans defending

and operational progress in an unconventional environment. It would be a problem

from a series of hedgerows, bogged down in the French inland bocage. Collins,

that would plague American leaders for the duration of their war in Vietnam.

studying the terrain on the VII Corps front, knew his subordinate units were in for
"tough sledding;' and his calculations proved accurate. The 83rd Infantry Division,
leading the corps attack on July 4, lost nearly 1,400 men and failed to achieve its

Dubious Metrics in Vietnam

7

objective of Sainteney. The Americans made scant progress on the second day,
and a sense of frustration began to permeate the Allied high command. Supreme

In February 1966, the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-

Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower recalled, "In temporary stalemates ...

nam (MACY), General William C. Westmoreland, arrived at Honolulu for a presi-

there always exists the problem of maintaining morale among fighting men while

dential summit meeting to receive formal guidance for the coming year.

8

Westmoreland had been in command for over eighteen months and had supervised

For the next three weeks, the Allies measured their progress in the number of hedge-

the buildup of American forces in Vietnam. In the dark days of 1965, when South

rows taken, hardly a basis for sustaining troop morale or displacing the Germans
from French soil.

Vietnam seemed on the verge of collapse, he had managed the allied riposte to the

The deadlock finally broke when Operation Cobra, launched on July 25, smashed

lutionary forces (Vietcong9 ). By year's end, a wave of optimism swept through the

through the German defenses at St. Lo and beyond. Allied difficulties in establish-

American mission in South Vietnam. The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division had won an

ing and expanding the beachhead and breaking out of the Norman hedgerows

apparently stunning victory over NVA regulars in the Central Highlands' Ia Drang

they are suffering losses and are meanwhile hearing their commanders criticized."

dual threat of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units and southern communist revo-

6
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government, •-"-'·..._ ..............
At Honolulu, Secretary of Defense

S. McNamara

State

Dean Rusk assigned Westmoreland a number of goals to help gauge American progress for the coming year. Among the primary strategic objectives, increasing
percentage of South Vietnam's population living in secure areas
did multiplying base areas denied to

Vietcong and pacifying high-priority

locales. These were hardly new goals. However, with the introduction of American
ground combat forces in mid-1965, McNamara and Rusk believed they finally had
the tools to make substantial progress in all

though, viewed

his overall mission as a sequential process. To

commander,

summit

meeting's first strategic objective of"attrit[ing] ... Viet Cong
major efforts toward pacification or population security.

.................. ....

Over the next three weeks, the
,.._..,_u._, ...,_..

War Zone C.

of American units

November,

U.S.

President Lyndon B.

spur social and

in

airmen

over 1,600 sorties and r1 ..,,.., ..,,,.r1

fighting alone, November 8,

South Vietnam, military operations took center stage in 1966.
sights on the northwest portion

H

preceded any

10

Westmoreland set

Air Force
bombers pummeled "''-'-"'"-'"' --.. . .,. . _
killed and 23 wounded, the Americans had

Vietnam-

ese forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the
Johnson had hoped that the conference

Divisions rushed into

high. So too

South Vietnam's III

Corps Tactical Zone. From there, the communists drew strength from

General

found

invio-

lable base areas inside the Cambodian border while maintaining pressure on Saigon.11 Westmoreland's

target was the 9th People's

Armed Forces

..... ,.,,,,,..,.,, ... with intentional inaccuracies at worst.

1-'"'"'"''1-i.'"'

(PLAF) Division. A major Vietcong unit supporting the NVA, the 9th had parried

mations, exaggerations, and

terrain all made

local U.S. forces for months. If the division were destroyed, MACV argued, pacifi-

technique for measuring progress. In a war partly '-'-J,,A.._,, ... u.., ....

cation of the countryside could begin in earnest. Preoccupied with searching for

though, there seemed to be few alternatives. As westnrio1:e1amd. s

and destroying enemy formations, the Americans overlooked that much of the

officer curtly stated, "To obtain the attrition rate, enemy bodies had to be ... ,_,._uu. ..,...,..

Vietcong's power derived from its political organization in
hamlets

rural villages and

of Saigon. Based on their conventional

from World

While attrition formed an important element of American
hardly served as the guiding principle. Westmoreland believed

War II and the Korean War, many U.S. commanders viewed attrition of the enemy

enemy forces would help lead to larger political

as a necessary

tenure, MACY had realized that quantitative

step to achieving their larger strategic ends. Westmoreland

clearly thought along these lines when he ordered Operation Attleboro launched
12

of enemy kills ......,._........,..., . . ...,.._u.....

measured progress in an unconventional environment. Body counts did not necessarily produce reliable qualitative assessments of

in the fall of 1966.

The battles comprising Operation Attleboro illustrated

Even before westna01:e1acnd, s

ephemeral nature of

American gains against the Vietcong. Brigadier General Edward H.

Saussure's

strength. While General
Division,

enemy's military and political

thought that

crippled

9th PLAF

the first week of November

196th Brigade moved into Tay Ninh province in mid-September and immediately

They instead withdrew west, closer to their .._,.,_ uuv~·

began a series of battalion-sized probing operations searching for supply caches and

bat units left, the VC quietly returned. Reducing

enemy base camps. The 196th had been in country for less than two months, and

not diminished their political

enemy contact during the campaign's first weeks had been light. On November 3, de

the enemy was one thing. Defeating him politically was something alt<)ge:tht~r

.......

13

machine gun and rocket fire ripped into the American formations. De Saussure's

a point

com-

.uu.A ....., ... n.,,._,

Attleboro did not break

Saussure stumbled into the lead reconnaissance company of the 9th Division. Enemy

~. . .

Vietcong's

few American commanders realized at

in

8
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areas

If estimating progress
assessing unit and soldier effectiveness in
province. During the fighting's opening rounds in early November, American units
quickly became separated from one another and disoriented in the harsh terrain.

u1,.,i.1,.,ii,,..,.,.

Though kill ratios became a central • a ... ._._.,._i._,....,._

sven contemporary officers sensed that
of army generals who served in Vietnam, SS

noted that

In a 1974 survey
kill ratio was a

20

tantly concluded that the 196th Infantry Brigade had "cracked" under the pressures

"misleading device to estimate progress."
Given the complexities of establishing appropriate metrics in a counterinsurgency

of combat.18 Clearly, unit and soldier performance under fire concerned MACV, but

environment, this work evaluates how the American army in Vietnam '-'-'"''·un.. .._._

other problems existed as well. If killing the enemy did not translate into political
progress, how could MACV accurately measure effectiveness and progress at all?

measured its own progress and effectiveness. It argues that the U.S.
component of MACV failed to accurately gauge performance and progress because, as an

How would MACV know if an area was "pacified?" How should commanders

organization, it was unable to identify what Scott S. Gartner has called "dominant

define "security?" If intelligence officers were unable to provide precise assessments

Westmoreland relieved General de Saussure on November 14 and MACV reluc-

of enemy strength levels, how would field commanders know if the Vietcong and

indicators" within the complex operating environment of Southeast Asia. In
oping the dominant indicator approach for assessing wartime effectiveness, Gartner

North Vietnamese forces were in fact succumbing to attrition? In a counterin-

has argued that military organizations often misjudge how they are performing

surgency environment, how did American officers and soldiers know whether or
not they were making progress over time? It is upon these questions, and most

because a host of variable factors influence combat. Contradictory
quently result. For Gartner, the "modern battlefield produces too much information

importantly the last, which this study looks to shed light.

for individuals to assess fully. So they

the available information to

"IJ'""--.LJ..l'-

indictors." Dominant indicators thus "represent an organization's central measure of
performance." 21 While much of the Vietnam historiography maintains that

Measuri

Effectiveness

counts" served as the U.S. Army's only indicator of success in Vietnam, this argument is too simplistic and unsupported by the vast number of reports generated by
22

tegic progress is critical to both army operations and organizational learning. Pro-

MACV in attempting to measure wartime progress.
In revealing how American officers and soldiers, particularly those assigned to

gress often validates unit effectiveness, doctrine, training, and an army's tactical

MACV, assessed both their effectiveness and progress in Vietnam, this study argues

approach to fighting. Progress on a conventional, linear battlefield is often clearly

that the U.S. Army's ineffective approach to establishing functional metrics

discernable. An army on the offense is either moving forward or not, killing enemy

from two primary factors. First, few officers possessed any real knowledge on how to

troops or not. A defending army is either holding its ground or retiring before the

gauge progress in an unconventional environment, particularly within the

enemy. Progress, of course, is not constant. Stalled offensives can recover momentum,

setting of South Vietnam. While officers understood the basics of political-military

just as crumbling defenses can recuperate after early setbacks. The Allied breakout

coordination in countering insurgencies, and faithfully attempted to implement

from the Norman bocage region and the subsequent hardening of German defenses

such an approach in Vietnam, the majority held only a superficial appreciation of

along the Siegfried Line illustrated how success and failure can be fleeting. Still, in

the intricacies involved in unconventional warfare. Most American officers serving

most conventional operations, progress is tangible-to the combatants, to the ci-

in MACV deployed to Southeast Asia with limited knowledge or practical experi-

vilian populace, and to both sides' political leadership. Such is usually not the case in

ence in assessing counterinsurgency operations. They possessed even less under-

Separating the assessment of military effectiveness from that of operational and stra-

counterinsurgencies.

19

In fact, the unconventional nature of the Vietnam War created innumerable prob-

u.1..:>1..u.1.•1.-0..

standing of the cultural landscape on which they were fighting. As the Attleboro
experience implies, notions of one's own effectiveness

as much as

re-

lems for those measuring progress and military effectiveness. MACV, to its credit,

ality of that effectiveness. MACV's process of establishing what was thought to be

realized early on that it needed to develop assessment metrics for fighting an insur-

useful performance metrics thus becomes an important undercurrent within this

gency. The military staff, however, produced an unmanageable system. MACV's
monthly "Measurement of Progress" reports covered innumerable aspects of the

work.
Second, the U.S. Army in Vietnam often stumbled

fighting in Vietnam-force ratios, VC/NVA incidents, tactical air sorties, weapons

a consensus on its strategy. In its inability to develop coherent strategic objectives

the

'-VJ.H.LJ.•---

IO
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Introduction

u

to
bat operations

on

23

and security. While MACY designed these missions to support pacification and
the re-establishment of governmental control in South Vietnam, their wide range
undermined efforts at measuring progress. Metrics for a search-and-destroy mission in 1966 might not be practical for a pacification mission in 1969.
count made sense

body

fighting NVA regiments in the Central Highlands. It

served little use, however, in determining how much progress a Mekong Delta
village was making in freeing itself from insurgent influence. MACY never articu-

tactical effectiveness in terms
logistical support for tactical \..u.;;;.a.~;._,,_,, ....,,.,,,.,.

lated how field commanders should prioritize their efforts, for in large part it

1944 Nor-

never agreed on where the main threat lay. Pacification and civic action missions
of
force units. The unresolved debate lasted

Vietnamese main
United States' involve-

ment in Southeast Asia and left MACY without a clear strategy to assess.
with insufficient foundational knowledge of counterinsurgencies and vague
strategic objectives, MACY embraced Secretary of Defense McNamara's advice that
everything that was measurable should in fact be

The problem of gauging

effectiveness and progress stemmed not from a lack of effort on the part of army
officers or a single-minded commitment to counting bodies. Rather, complications
followed from collecting too many data points without evaluating

accurately

such data reflected progress on the battlefield. Few within the American mission
analyzed the data to develop meaningful trends. Senior officers thus had no way of

1Vtzr-may mean
population. 27
If more recent
effectiveness,

~

.u ... ................

American

practical experience upon which to

This is not to say

accurately assessing their level of success in counterinsurgency operations. Rarely

gency was unstudied in the

did MACY staff officers link their metrics to their strategic objectives. Conse-

Cold War strategies created an upsurge in insurgency

counterinsur-

1950s and early 1960s. Changes in U.S.

In

quently, MACY-and much ofDoD-went about measuring everything and, in a

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev pledged support to countries waging

real sense, measured nothing. In the process of data collection, the data had become

""''·"J''"''--'-

an end unto itself. Ultimately, this failure in establishing functional metrics

liberation" against Western influence.
countered, having already
the

tiveness and progress played a significant role in undermining the American conduct of the war in Southeast Asia. 24

proach (flexible response) to the American

Soviet

F.

..!.~\.«HJL'-U.

.._,h,...,AAAAV'

strategic nuclear deterrence. In its place, Kennedy sought a more
conventional ground forces and emphasizing

ua.JL"-"''"'""u.

of co1ntaL1n:me:nt, ............. ,."'u"'·
use of Special Forces. 28

changing political environment encouraged a

and '-'"-'''""H.-•-•uu on

In Search of Relevant Metrics

unconventional warfare. Interpretations of guerrilla warfare and .._v,u.u•c'-'•''•• "..,_ ... ~~"""'"'

In the late 1980s, Allan R. Millet, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman

operations flourished, from Cuban
Guevara to Briton Robert .........'-'"-"·"''"'-'"
a host of "specialists" in between. The expanding
provoked Vietnam

developed a comprehensive framework for gauging

effectiveness of military or-

ganizations. The authors defined military effectiveness as "the process by which

expert Bernard B. Fall to lament that "too many amateur . . v

armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one

have had their hands in stirring the revolutionary
himself would maintain "the u. .................. , ..... nPr~~1rPF·n

that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically

lutionary War" was that "the people and the army must

............... ,_-

"''"'-'-·L~._........
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operating in the same political universe as Vietnamese
tual capacity of U.S. Army officers in the

certainly were difficult to measure accurately.

1960s.

the French had lost in Indochina during the 1950s because of their inability to gain
the political support of an increasingly nationalistic civilian population.

31

British

nature of combat in Vietnam compounded

difficulties. No two battles

or engagements were identical. Environmental, behavioral, and political circum-

experiences in Malaya and the U.S. advisory role in Greece also seemed to indicate

stances all varied in ways that may have seemed haphazard to Americans unfamiliar

that revolutionary warfare would be an essential part of modern conflict and that

with unconventional warfare. 36 Further muddying the waters was the "mosaic"

strategy must include more than military elements. 32 Reflective officers grasped the

nature of revolutionary warfare in Vietnam. As Westmoreland's chief intelligence

need to coordinate military and political actions. The answer, wrote Major General

officer persuasively asserted, depending on the balance between military and polit-

33

ical struggles, insurgents often avoided combat in one area while seeking it in an-

For commanders on the ground, however, implementing such a proposal was not so
straightforward. How could a division commander devise and offer a "better idea''

other. Consequently, what might have been an effective counterinsurgency technique
in one province or district might be irrelevant or even counterproductive in,...,,...,.,.,..,~,, ..

once he was deployed to Southeast Asia and engaged in combat operations? Once

portion of the country. 37 This mosaic nature, which many American senior

occupied in searching for and destroying enemy units, there often seemed little

seemed to have overlooked, made assessing army progress in Vietnam all the more

incentive to devote time and resources away from actual fighting.
American officers largely dismissed British and French experiences for their

daunting.
So too did the nature of the American military experience in Southeast Asia. U.S.

seeming irrelevance to tactical combat operations in Vietnam. Westmoreland

Army policies for the rotation of personnel did little to promote either transmission

believed that Malaya's unique environment and political situation offered few les-

of lessons or thoughtful analysis of unit effectiveness. As one observer noted,

Edward G. Lansdale in 1964, "is to oppose the Communist idea with a better idea."

sons for MACV.

34

Thus, despite a rising interest on the subject, U.S. officers came

"shortness of tours for staff and commanding officers (while sound for the troops on

across few suggestions for measuring success in counterinsurgencies. Most under-

grounds of morale), together with the conformity of the system, led to a dependence

stood the political element of unconventional warfare but struggled to find advice

on statistical results." 38 The validity of these statistics often depended entirely upon

on integrating military operations into the larger political context of fighting

the reporting commander. With tours of duty rarely extending beyond one year, a

against insurgencies. In spite of the mass of counterinsurgency writings, military

commander's perceptions could be a significant variable in determining organiza-

officers possessed few practical texts on the political-military relationships of revolu-

tional effectiveness.

tionary warfare. Even fewer sources discussed measuring effectiveness once military

No less important was the MACV change of command between William Westmoreland and Creighton Abrams. While many accounts overstate the differences

units were engaged in fighting insurgents.
Given the dearth of resources on measuring counterinsurgency effectiveness, it

between Westmoreland and Abrams, an important point remains. Shifts in com-

seems no wonder that U.S. officers found it difficult to evaluate their efforts in Viet-

mand focus and in national strategy objectives required changes to metrics for deter-

nam. Achieving political objectives using military tools was a complicated task.

mining the effectiveness of MACV's own operational plans. Since MACY never

Most officers deploying to Vietnam knew population security to be an important

made such modifications, its system for measuring progress and effectiveness became

task within the political realm of counterinsurgency. The question remained of how

increasingly irrelevant as the war proceeded. 39

commanders could discern whether their units were making progress. Robert

Doctrinal gaps added yet another element of uncertainty. Commanders could not

Thompson illustrated the problems in establishing criteria based on hostile incident

even turn to their own field manuals to determine military effectiveness in a coun-

rates. A decrease in enemy incidents might mean the government was in control but

terinsurgency environment. Department of the Army Field Manual 31-16, Counter-

might also mean the insurgents were so established politically they no longer needed

guerrilla Operations, while comprehensive, offered scant advice on how to gauge

to fight. Thompson did propose that the quality of information voluntarily gained

progress in an unconventional war. The manual did counsel commanders and staffs

from the population was an important gauge, perhaps indicating that qualitative

to develop detailed estimates of both the civil and military situation in their areas of

standards were more important than quantitative ones in determining progress. As

operation. This included analyzing weather and terrain, the population, the guerrilla

he noted in 1969, "In the end an insurgency is only defeated by good government
which attracts voluntary popular support."

35

For young American officers and

forces, and what resources the host country could offer. The doctrine counseled
staffs to assess the effectiveness of the guerrilla, his relation to the population, and

Introduction

the effectiveness of his communications and intelligence networks. At the same

area of analysis can be defined as metrics of mission success

time, FM 31-16 recommended that planners assess the "effectiveness of measures to

broad interpretation of combat power, expanding the definition to include political,

deny the guerrilla access to resources required by him."

40

Lefi: unanswered was the

question of "how?"

takes a

social, and cultural aspects. Naturally, the overall objective of military operations in
Vietnam was important for measuring mission success. As historian Russell Weigley

As the war proceeded, few if any Americans truly knew if they were winning or

stressed, "to answer the question of whether an institution is effective, we must first

losing. Operating blindly made it nearly impossible for MACV to make prudent

ask the further question: effective in pursuit of what purposes ?" 42 Even while prose-

adjustments to tactical and operational procedures. Such confusion made it equally

cuting his strategy of attrition, Westmoreland argued that pacification efforts

difficult for administration officials to provide strategic focus as the war proceeded.

remained the crucial element of American policy. Despite this assertion, body

Frustration became palpable at the highest levels of command in Vietnam. Major

counts seemingly became the prominent index of progress in a war without front

General Frederick C. Weyand, commander of II Field Force, offered his assess-

lines and territorial objectives. 43 This study uncovers the host of other metrics used

ments to a visiting Washington official in late 1967. "Before I came out here a year

by MACV to measure its progress. It examines how officers defined and measured

ago, I thought we were at zero. I was wrong. We were at minus fifty. Now we're at

pacification security, how they evaluated the effectiveness of their Army

zero."

41

the

Republic ofVietnam (ARVN) training programs, and how they assessed the damage
being inflicted on the enemy's political infrastructure.
Finding dominant indicators for mission success became increasingly difficult as

A Framework for Assessment

MACV added further metrics to evaluate local support and popular attitudes. In
exploring these metrics, this study will consider how MACV measured the popula-

All this raises the question of whether one can even quantify something as abstract

tion's trust and cooperation. It probes how U.S. officers assessed voluntary aid from

as a counterinsurgency campaign. In such an environment, what is a measurable

villagers and to what extent local residents trusted their governmental officials or

standard? One could make the argument that metrics in counterinsurgency opera-

feared insurgents, who so often reemerged when American forces departed. This

tions are pointless. Political will, loyalty of the population, and an individual's sense

study additionally reveals the problems MACV faced in rating its performance in

of security cannot be accurately measured. But if there are no measurable standards

winning the intelligence war, arguably a prerequisite for winning the larger war in

in a counterinsurgency operation, do senior officials simply measure progress based

Vietnam. Army officers too often stressed quantity over quality in their reporting

on a military commander's instinct within his area of responsibility? This appears

systems. In the process, they at times missed the importance of information being

problematic, regardless of how much senior officers trust their subordinate leaders'

voluntarily provided as a metric of mission success. Villagers trusting U.S. advisors

judgments. Certainly commanders' personal assessments are important, but relying

enough to identify insurgents within their hamlets seemed an important indicator

solely on intuition in determining progress is just as troubling as relying exclusively

of progress. If American forces were pursuing insurgent units without local assis-

on statistics such as body counts.

tance, conceivably their offensive operations mattered little. Broken Vietcong cells

In revealing how American officers and soldiers assessed their effectiveness and

simply would be replaced by a sympathetic or frightened population.

progress in Vietnam, this study looks beyond body counts. MACV established a

Perhaps clear measures of ineffectiveness were equally as important as measures of

host of other metrics that often contradicted one another and provided a false sense

success. Metrics ofmission failures thus comprise the second area in which this study

of progress. General DuPuy's evaluation of Operation Attleboro suggests that re-

analyzes MACV's system for assessing effectiveness and progress. Such metrics

lying on the wrong indicators can result not only in contradictory assessments but

should have covered a wide range of potential missteps-unwarranted "collateral

inaccurate ones as well. Reports exaggerated the damage inflicted on the 9th PLAF

damage;' wrongful detentions, or civilian deaths based on faulty intelligence, or

Division, damage that hardly upset the Vietcong's political hold in Tay Ninh prov-

enemy initiated battlefield contact. While arguably a negative approach to gauging

ince. This relationship between indicators and resultant staff estimates and com-

progress, it seems a vital element of confronting an insurgency. U.S. strategy in Viet-

mand decisions serves as the principal framework for analysis of this study. It will

nam depended on units operating within legal boundaries to maintain legitimacy

examine three main areas in which officers and soldiers defined and evaluated their

among the population. Contemporary counterinsurgency literature discussed the

effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations during their time in Vietnam.

importance of operating within these bounds, and keeping track of transgressions
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may have helped to

in a given area.

been advisable for officers to measure untoward acts

it would
on

they were charged to protect.
The final area of analysis can be described as metrics oforganizational effectiveness

diplomatic offensive to put pressure on Hanoi to cease its
ground battle in the South."
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While

Westmore-

ground combat

if ever,

occurs in a vacuum, this study will limit its focus to the U.S. Army experience
the Vietnam War. External variables such as air power and the performance

and considers how the U.S. Army assessed itself as an institution. Both historians

allies certainly influenced the U.S. Army's ability to achieve its objectives.

and former officers have held varying perspectives on the army's performance during

these areas will be considered only to the extent that they shaped the army's percep-

the Vietnam War, especially in the conflict's latter years. This study probes that

tions of its own progress and effectiveness. As an example, this study will not

debate, asking if the quality of American ground combat troops eroded over time.

air power effectiveness in Vietnam. Rather, it will assess how army officers viewed air

This institutional-based metric rests largely on factors internal to the U.S. Army,

power as a means for increasing their own effectiveness in winning the war. 45

such as morale, unit cohesion, and the will to fight. As such, commanders' assessments of their units loom large. Determining a unit's level of motivation and morale

1-1n.n'""",.

Clearly, U.S. Army combat units were not the only American forces operating in
South Vietnam. American advisors, working with both ARYN units and

dis-

were among the most intangible aspects of assessing military effectiveness in Viet-

trict and provincial chiefs, were intricately involved in missions of pacification and

nam. These are critical areas to explore, however, because they affected the army's

Vietnamization. Their efforts in measuring effectiveness had a marked influence on

capacity to accomplish its assigned missions.

command and staff perceptions at MACY. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES),

Measuring organizational effectiveness is further warranted because of its rela-

established in January 1967, attempted to gauge progress in the pacification effort

tionship to the metrics of mission success and failure. Here, one must distinguish

and fed directly into the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

between-and separate-the terms "effectiveness" and "progress;' especially for

(CO RDS) directorate at MACY. While a thorough discussion of the American

counterinsurgencies. As this work demonstrates, the two concepts, while related, are

visory effort falls outside the parameters of this study, U.S. district and provincial

not the same. American commanders in Vietnam, however, often conflated and con-

advisors and those training ARYN units supplied a wealth of data to MACY. How

fused the terms. Throughout the war, they trumpeted the combat effectiveness of

well MACY thought evaluation tools such as HES helped assess overall progress

their troops on the battlefield, believing that such effectiveness equated to progress

during the war is crucial to understanding the relationship between pacification pro-

in the overall war effort. Yet in the complex political-military environment of Viet-

grams and American strategy.

nam, effectively killing the enemy did not guarantee progress toward strategic objec-

U.S. Marine Corps operations also fall outside the purview of this study, even

tives. Therefore, this study explores not only how MACY defined and perceived

though the Corps operated under the MACY command structure. Despite their

organizational effectiveness but how senior officers related these notions to their

influence on certain campaigns and battles, and their oftentimes innovative way of

broader evaluations of progress.

approaching pacification missions, the marines ultimately did little to alter the

Finally, this last area of analysis investigates whether there was a decline of unit

course of American strategy or the way in which the command measured progress

effectiveness within the U.S. Army over time. Poor race relations, drug problems,

and effectiveness. They often served only as an auxiliary to MACV planning and

and contentious officer-enlisted relations epitomized the final years of American in-

operations. As an example, the pioneering approach of Combined Action Platoons,

volvement in Vietnam. This study asks if these issues truly eroded the army's effec-

a combination of marine volunteers and Vietnamese militia living inside villages and

tiveness. It seems important to ask if ostensible changes within the U.S. Army's ranks

working primarily on civic action projects, failed to take hold at the strategic level.

in the early 1970s altered how senior officers wrestled with measuring success.

More importantly, the marines were responsible for a limited geographical area and
could not affect the insurgency's attack on large portions of the country or the stability of the Saigon government. Though the marines offered creditable alternatives

Limits of the

to fighting the insurgency in Vietnam and fought valiantly in some of the heaviest
fighting of the war, their efforts, from MACV's perspective, too often remained of a

Counterinsurgencies are complex affairs. Former advisor Dave R. Palmer claimed

secondary nature.

that the American war in Vietnam in 1966 included four components: "the air cam-

In the end, this is a study of how the U.S. Army component of the Military Assis-

paign against North Vietnam; a nation-building effort within South Vietnam; a

tance Command in Vietnam assessed its progress and effectiveness throughout a
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long war in Southeast Asia.

existing evaluation models for counterinsur-

gency operations, the army struggled to measure if and how much progress was
being made against an enemy committed to revolutionary warfare. Searching always
for discernible signs of progress, either on the military or political front, MACY and
its field commanders labored to develop accurate metrics of success for an unconventional environment. They never succeeded. The conventional benchmarks of
World War II no longer applied. That the army never could determine if it was winning or losing goes far in explaining the final outcome of the war in Vietnam.

